The first discipline in any multi-accused question is order. Deal with the perpetrator first — establish that the principal offence was actually committed — and only then turn to the others. Starting with the accomplice is the most common structural mistake on this topic, and it usually leads to an answer that never quite says what crime anyone committed.
Accessory liability under section 7(1)
Section 7(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1997 provides that a person who aids, abets, counsels or procures the commission of an indictable offence is liable to be indicted, tried and punished as a principal offender. Note carefully what that does and does not do. It does not create a separate offence of being an accessory; it makes the accessory guilty of the substantive offence — murder, robbery, whatever it was. So you conclude that the accused is guilty of robbery as an accessory, not guilty of accessoryship.
Two thresholds follow. First, the principal offence must actually have been committed — you cannot be an accessory to a crime that never happened. Second, the perpetrator need not have been convicted, or even caught: what must be proved is that the offence was committed, so an accessory can be convicted where the perpetrator has died or fled.
The four verbs — and the causation split
The four words are not synonyms; Parliament would not use four words if two would do (Attorney General's Reference (No.1 of 1975) [1975] QB 773 England & Wales). In practice they divide into two groups, and the dividing line is causation.
- Aid (assist — supplying the weapon, keeping watch), abet (encourage at the time) and counsel (encourage beforehand) require no causal link. The slightest assistance or encouragement suffices, and it need not be shown that the help caused the perpetrator to act.
- Procure is different: to procure is to produce by endeavour, and the accused must have brought the offence about. Spiking a driver's drink so that he unknowingly drives over the limit procures his offence (AG's Reference (No.1 of 1975) Eng).
How slight is slight? Very: a nod of encouragement has sufficed (R v Giannetto [1997] 1 Cr App R 1 Eng), and a supplier indifferent to what happens next can still be an aider and abettor — desire is not required (National Coal Board v Gamble [1959] 1 QB 11 Eng, Devlin J). But the help must actually have been given: encouragement that never reaches the perpetrator has assisted nothing.
Mere presence is not enough
Standing there while a crime happens does not make you a party to it, and a bystander does not become an accessory by failing to intervene. Presence becomes liability only where the accused intended their presence to assist or encourage the perpetrator. In R v Coney (1882) 8 QBD 534 Eng presence taking no part and not in concert with others was not aiding at all; in R v Clarkson [1971] 1 WLR 1402 Eng convictions fell because no intention to encourage had been proved.
The Irish authorities say the same with more force. In The People (DPP) v Jordan [2006] IECCA 71; [2006] 3 IR 425 IE Geoghegan J held encouragement may be implied from the circumstances, but a jury may not speculate it from presence alone. And in The People (DPP) v Boyle [2010] IECCA 3; [2010] 1 IR 787 Court of Criminal Appeal (IE) Denham J approved the trial judge's direction that one cannot be an aider and abettor by accident.
The accomplice's mens rea
The prosecution must prove the accused knew that their conduct was assisting, encouraging or procuring an offence. Give a stranger directions that he uses to reach a victim he then kills, and you are not an accessory — innocent assistance is no assistance in law.
But the knowledge required is not as precise as students assume. An accessory before the fact need not know the exact crime, its method, time or target: it is enough that they knew the nature of the crime intended (The People (DPP) v Egan [1989] IR 681 Court of Criminal Appeal (IE), Costello J, where the accused was asked to open his workshop to a van for "a small stroke"). English authority agrees that it suffices that the offence committed was one the accused contemplated (DPP for Northern Ireland v Maxwell [1978] 1 WLR 1350 Eng). There is still a ceiling: knowledge that a theft is planned does not make you an accessory to a murder the perpetrator secretly intended. Where the offence is murder, the older authorities pulled in different directions — The People (DPP) v Madden [1977] IR 336 IE (O'Higgins CJ) requires knowledge of the intended unlawful killing, Maxwell is satisfied with a contemplated offence, and Gamble suggests indifference can be enough. The Supreme Court has since addressed the point in The People (DPP) v Dekker [2015] IESC 107; [2017] 2 IR 1 (Dunne J): the accessory must have the mens rea required by s.4 of the Criminal Justice Act 1964 — an intention to kill or cause serious injury — though it need not be identical to the principal's; and an accessory who assists knowing that the principal is about to carry out an assault while armed with a lethal weapon will ordinarily be taken to have foreseen that the principal intended to kill or seriously injure.
Common design — and what happens when the plan goes wrong
A common design is an agreement between two or more people to commit a crime: where they so agree and one perpetrates it, the others are guilty of the same crime as parties to the design. Whether this is a distinct route or just an instance of accessory liability is disputed — Hobhouse LJ in R v Stewart and Schofield [1995] 3 All ER 159 Eng insisted joint enterprise is different in kind — but the label rarely matters, guilt and punishment being the same either way (R v Gnango [2011] UKSC 59; [2012] 1 AC 827 Eng).
The doctrine earns its keep when the perpetrator does something beyond the plan. The rule in R v Anderson & Morris [1966] 2 QB 110 Eng is that each party is liable for acts done in pursuance of the joint enterprise, including unusual consequences — but not where one party goes beyond what was tacitly agreed. Everything therefore turns on one question, did the perpetrator exceed the scope of the agreement?, and you cannot answer it until you have defined the scope.
There are two competing ways of doing that, and Irish law contains both. On the agreement approach, the scope is fixed by what the parties actually agreed and communicated, so what one of them contemplated but never communicated to the other is not relevant (Blayney J, The People (DPP) v Cumberton (Unreported, Court of Criminal Appeal, 5 December 1994) Court of Criminal Appeal (IE)). On the contemplation approach, the scope extends to whatever a party foresaw might happen (Lord Hutton in R v Powell; R v English [1997] UKHL 45; [1999] 1 AC 1 Eng). Name the approach you are applying, because on some facts they diverge. Do not present either as the settled Irish rule: in Dekker the Supreme Court said that what the participants agreed, tacitly or expressly, is relevant, that "issues of foresight are very relevant", and that asking whether the principal's offence was reasonably foreseeable by the accessory is in line with Irish case law.
The Irish applications repay reading together. In The People (DPP) v Murray [1977] IR 360 Supreme Court (IE) Henchy J held that the carrying and use of loaded guns amply supported a common agreement to shoot to kill or cause serious injury, so Noel Murray was guilty of murder; but with no evidence that shooting a would-be captor who might be a Garda was an express or implied part of the design, Marie Murray's recklessness on that point was personal to her and outside the scope, so his conviction for capital murder could not stand. Griffin J dissented on that point. In The People (DPP) v Eccles (1986) 3 Frewen 36 IE the accused knew that resistance would be met with firearms, so their use was within the design. And in The People (DPP) v Doohan [2002] 4 IR 463 IE Denham J held that where an accused hired an assailant to cause serious injury and left the method to his discretion, a shooting was not beyond what was tacitly agreed — the exact method need not be pre-agreed.
Withdrawal from complicity
An accessory or party to a common design can escape liability by withdrawing before the crime is committed — but a change of mind, and of location, is nowhere near enough. The withdrawal must be communicated to the other parties in a timely and unequivocal way, and what is required is proportionate to how far the accused went: the more they did to further the enterprise, the more they must do to undo it.
The leading Irish authority is now The People (DPP) v Twomey [2024] IESC 31 Supreme Court (IE), in which the Supreme Court (O'Malley J) adopted a four-question test drawn from the New Zealand decision in Ahsin v R [2014] NZSC 153 New Zealand · Supreme Court: was there a clear demonstration of withdrawal to the principal offender before the crime; were steps taken to undo the accused's prior involvement or prevent the crime; were those steps everything reasonable and proportionate; and were they timely? On the facts the appellant had devised the scheme and recruited the assailant, yet gave only vague warnings, and the appeal was dismissed.
Related Criminal Law notes: murder vs manslaughter · attempts and inchoate offences · all free Criminal Law notes.
Need the full parties and accomplices topic?
Module 2 covers accessory liability under ss.7–8 of the Criminal Law Act 1997, mere presence, the accomplice's mens rea, common design and scope, withdrawal after Twomey, and accessories after the fact — with case tables, worked examples and a fixed order of attack for multi-accused problems.
see the full library →Frequently asked questions
Is an accessory guilty of a lesser offence than the perpetrator?
No. Section 7(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1997 makes a person who aids, abets, counsels or procures an indictable offence liable to be indicted, tried and punished as a principal offender. The accessory is guilty of the substantive offence itself and faces the same maximum punishment.
Can you be an accessory if the perpetrator is never convicted?
Yes. What must be proved is that the principal offence was committed, not that the perpetrator was caught or convicted. So an accessory can be convicted where the perpetrator has died or fled. But if the offence never happened at all, there is nothing to be an accessory to — the liability, if any, is inchoate.
Does simply being present at a crime make you an accomplice?
No. Mere presence is never enough, and failing to intervene does not create liability. The prosecution must prove the accused was there in order to assist or encourage the crime — accessory liability cannot be incurred by accident (Boyle). Encouragement can be implied from the circumstances, but it cannot be speculated from presence alone (Jordan).
What does it take to withdraw from a joint enterprise in Irish law?
Following The People (DPP) v Twomey, the accused must clearly communicate withdrawal to the principal offender before the crime, take steps to undo their involvement or prevent it, and those steps must be everything reasonable and proportionate to how far they went, and timely. Simply leaving the scene, or giving a vague warning, is not withdrawal.
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